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collaBoratioN aNd the ecology  
of democracy*
by Daniel Kemmis and Matthew McKinney**
InTroducTIon 
This article explores various citizen-driven, multiparty natural resource and public land management col-laborations, viewed as one emerging species within the 
“ecology” of democracy. Examples from the Quincy Library 
Group Partnership, Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest, 
Blackfoot Valley, and Valles Caldera Trust will trace the trajec-
tory of collaborative democracy from its organic inception to its 
present form. To anticipate the core of the argument: we believe 
that the kind of problemsolving collaboration we will be exam-
ining is democratic in the most fundamental sense of that word 
because it is nothing more nor less than the effort of people to 
shape the conditions under which they live, rather than leaving 
that shaping to someone else.
 We begin by explaining what we mean by an “emergent 
form of democracy.” This concept of emergence derives primar-
ily from complexity theory. Complexity theorists stress that it is 
inherently impossible to provide in advance a rule or algorithm 
that will produce the structure or pattern that in fact emerges.1 
This phenomenon is illustrated both in the social and physical 
realm: similar to emerging markets and cities, politics seem to 
merge naturally out of the human condition. As the bureaucratic 
state matured throughout the 20th century, it produced its own 
characteristic set of mechanisms for “participatory democracy,” 
including public notice and hearings, comment periods, and 
administrative appeals.
In terms of the evolving ecology of democracy, a new 
democratic life form is emerging in the open spaces left by 
the older, established democratic forms of representative, 
procedural, and direct democracy.2 This movement toward 
a collaborative democracy is a direct response to some of the 
shortcomings of the late 20th-century framework of procedural 
democracy.3 Whatever else public hearings might accomplish, 
they rarely result in democratic solutions.4 Surprisingly, it is the 
stakeholders, who have battled each other in public hearings for 
decades, who are beginning to engage in serious, face-to-face 
problem solving.5 Therefore a desire for authentically-engaged 
and constructive citizen involvement arose, producing new, less 
structured forms of deliberative and collaborative democracy. 
Multiparty collaborative natural resource and land manage-
ment includes elements of alternative dispute resolution and 
deliberation, but also exhibits unique features that justify its 
treatment as a separate species of democracy. Specifically, the 
emergence of collaboration is also a reaction to the previously 
neglected importance of “place” when governing public lands. 
Because so much of the collaborative experience to this point is 
place-driven, it seems worthwhile to explore what there is about 
place-focused problems in land management that has produced 
so much of this emergent democratic form. 
The emergence oF collaBoraTIve land  
and naTural resources managemenT In The 
amerIcan WesT 
To that end, we turn our attention to the remarkable spread 
of collaborative practices in our own place—the American 
West—and to a range of collaborative activities arising within 
this familiar setting. The West is characterized by contentious, 
fairly localized natural resource issues on or near public lands 
in the western states.6 Our hope is that, by examining how col-
laboration has emerged and matured in this rather narrow niche of 
public land management, we can develop useful methodologies for 
studying what catalyzes, constrains, and sustains its existence (or 
for studying what might cause its failure to thrive) in other settings. 
There are two especially salient components of this land 
management niche. One is literally ecological: these collabora-
tions, without exception, revolve around the uses to be made of 
very specific landscapes, as well as the soil, water, flora, and 
fauna of those landscapes.7 Part or all of each of these landscapes 
consist of public land, usually administered either by the U.S. 
Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management.8 In most 
cases, the parties to the collaboration include natural resource 
extractors and users of the public land in question on the one 
hand (timber or grazing interests, for example) and conserva-
tionists seeking to protect the land or the species inhabiting it 
on the other.9 A fundamental feature of the dynamics behind 
collaboration in these cases is the simple fact that different 
people or interests have conflicting objectives for what should 
happen to one particular piece of land and its natural resources. 
The second key component of this setting is the existing 
decision-making system that constitutes the governing frame-
work for the public lands. This decision structure is remark-
ably complex, comprising a broad range of statutes such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),10 the 
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Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”),11 the National Forest 
Management Act of 1976 (“NFMA”),12 the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”),13 and the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (“FACA”).14 These statutes 
are further fleshed out by a corresponding and even more volu-
minous set of agency regulations, multiple layers of appeals 
(including frequent recourse to federal courts), and the case law 
emerging from that litigation.15 This is the “procedural republic” 
in all its glory.16 
The increasing problems with this governing framework 
have been extensively noted and analyzed. For example, former 
Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus describes the public land 
and natural resources governance system as “the tangled web of 
overlapping and often contradictory laws and regulations under 
which our federal public lands are managed.”17 Congressman 
Scott McInnis, former Chair of the Subcommittee on Forests and 
Forest Health, defines the system as “a decision-making appa-
ratus that is on the verge of collapsing under its own weight.”18 
Similarly, former Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas calls 
this governing framework “a sort of blob,”19 and in June 2002, 
Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth presented to Congress a 
report entitled, “The Process Predicament,” which describes the 
effects of regulatory and administrative gridlock on national for-
est management.20 The report focused heavily on the Agency’s 
increasing inability to fulfill its primary duties.21 The undeniable 
fact remains that the current resolution processes for addressing 
natural resource conflicts on public lands simply do not work.
Collaborative democracy is emerging so profusely in this 
setting because many of the people with the greatest stakes in 
the landscapes in question find that the existing decision system 
cannot reconcile competing stakes in these resources as effec-
tively as can the stakeholders themselves acting on their own ini-
tiative.22 This response is especially rife in the vast reaches of the 
West where public lands and natural resources are so prevalent.23 
Here, in what is often referred to as the “public lands West,” we 
have seen a steadily growing number of local agreements among 
environmentalists, ranchers, loggers, miners, and recreation-
ists about how the public land and natural resources should be 
managed in their particular river drainage area or ecosystem.24 
More and more Westerners have come to realize that they 
can do better by their communities, economies, and ecosystems 
by working together outside of the established, centralized 
governing framework.25 Accordingly, they have largely aban-
doned the cumbersome, uncertain, underfunded, and increas-
ingly irrelevant mechanisms of that older structure.26 
The collaboration movement is a pragmatic response to the 
slowly accumulating evidence that our historical experiment 
with proceduralism produces mixed results at best. The more 
statutory and regulatory layers added to any particular issue, the 
denser the maze and the higher the likelihood that the system 
will malfunction. Then, it is not surprising that the “public lands 
West,” where more layers exist than anywhere else, is the place 
where the search for an alternative decision making structure is 
most active.27 It is because the existing system is so pervasively 
and palpably unworkable out West that people are willing to 
put so much work into fashioning an alternative. It is this set 
of circumstances, above all, that is propelling the collaborative 
movement in the West. 
There is simply too much at stake to let the prevailing 
system continue—and inevitably fail. As such, the collaborative 
method of resolving public land and natural resource issues has 
spread across the region evolving from a purely organic creation 
into its now-institutionalized state.28 And although some agen-
cies now promote collaboration in a variety of ways,29 this has 
not established the method’s foothold on the landscape at any-
one’s direction or by anyone’s design; collaborative democracy 
remains almost entirely undirected and most often occurs with-
out any official sanction or any clear way of connecting it to the 
existing decision structure.30 Thus, we will begin our tour of this 
democratic evolution with the most feral examples of collabora-
tion, and then move on to more domesticated instances. 
The QuIncy lIBrary grouP 
The Quincy Library Group is a typical example of a 
collaborative effort that arose organically and originated outside 
the established governing structure. In Quincy, California, mutu-
ally dissatisfied with a management plan proposed by the Forest 
Service, a group of loggers, environmentalists, citizens, and local 
government officials from the area came up with an alternative 
five-year management plan to preserve old growth, endangered 
species habitats, and roadless areas for 2.5 million acres of forest 
surrounding Quincy, and also to keep the town’s local sawmills 
in business.31 Unable to persuade the Forest Service to adopt 
the plan through the traditional methods, the group enlisted the 
support of their congressional delegation and eventually got their 
bill through Congress in 1996.32 Ultimately, the locally initiated 
collaboration created a congressionally binding resolution to the 
region’s valuable timber resources.33
The Beaverhead–deerlodge ParTnershIP 
The Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership is another example 
of the organic development of collaborative democracies. This 
Partnership emerged in response to the Forest Service’s forest 
plan review, which the Forest Service is obligated to conduct 
at least every fifteen years.34 In keeping with that requirement, 
the Forest Service published a new draft forest plan for the 
Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest of southwestern Montana 
in 2006.35 But reactions to the draft plan were mixed.36 Con-
servationists and timber interests had a shared history of deep 
antagonism, in which they had typically taken diametrically 
opposed positions at public hearings on anything proposed by the 
Forest Service.37 Thus, the owners of the locally owned lumber 
mills still operating in the area, already hard-pressed by global 
competition, were concerned that the proposed plan would drive 
them out of business because it would not allow them to har-
vest enough timber from the national forest to keep their mills 
running.38 Conservationists, on the other hand, were convinced 
that the proposed plan was short on wilderness designation and 
that the proposed fish and wildlife programs were not protective 
enough of threatened species.39 
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One local sawmill owner, Sherman Anderson, observed that 
environmental activism and Forest Service policy had reduced 
the amount of public timber coming into his sawmill from ninety 
percent of his feedstock to five percent.40 Those supply prob-
lems, coupled with fierce competition from Canadian mills, had 
driven a steady stream of small sawmills out of business over the 
last few years.41 Anderson, operating at a loss even before the 
bottom dropped out of the housing market in the recession of 
2008, feared that he would be next.42 
After years of conventional management tactics that 
resulted in this situation, representatives from five Montana 
lumber mills instead began meeting independently with local 
representatives from the National Wildlife Federation, the 
Montana Wilderness Association, and the Montana Trout 
Unlimited to explore whether they might collectively find more 
beneficial outcomes for forest management than those proposed 
by the Forest Service.43 This collaborative effort became known 
as the Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership.44 The partners found 
common ground after some of the conservationists acknowl-
edged that logging itself was not necessarily bad for wildlife 
and water quality if it was conducted in the right way and at 
the right scale.45 The timber interests, meanwhile, acknowledged 
the conservationists’ view that substantial portions of the forest 
should not be logged, but would be better protected as wilder-
ness.46 The two sides hammered out ways to fit fish and wildlife 
restoration into a sustainable timber-harvesting program.47 The 
Partnership’s laborious efforts were eventually incorporated into 
legislation introduced by Senator Jon Tester, which is currently 
pending in Congress.48 
The BlackFooT challenge
As this kind of citizen-initiated collaboration has gained 
momentum in the public land and resources arena, government 
agencies have sometimes been invited to become collaborating 
partners. Consider, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge. This 
collaborative group that includes private landowners, federal and 
state land managers, local government officials, and corporate 
landowners now coordinates much of the management of the 
Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent public and private 
lands—approximately 2,400 square miles in western Montana.49 
Working together, the mission of the Blackfoot Challenge is 
“to coordinate efforts that conserve and enhance the natural 
resources and rural way of life throughout the watershed.”50 The 
Blackfoot Challenge is now known nationally as a collaborative 
model for preserving the wild beauty, ecological health, and 
natural resources of the watershed.51 
When the Obama administration launched its America’s 
Great Outdoors initiative in 2010, it staged its first public event 
on the ranch owned by Jim Stone, the chair of the Blackfoot 
Challenge board, as a way of underscoring how important the 
collaborative efforts of groups like this have become in the 
recent history of American conservation.52 In a recent interview, 
Denny Iverson, the Challenge Board’s Treasurer, explained 
that he moved with his parents from Minnesota to a Blackfoot 
Valley ranch in 1975.53 He was in high school at the time, and 
he tells how his father, whose dream had long been to own a 
ranch in Montana, initially struggled to make this dream ranch 
profitable.54 Many ranchers were already employing creative 
ways to preserve their properties. For example, like many of 
their neighbors, one way the Iverson’s had kept their ranch in 
the black was by leasing some of the surrounding public land 
for their cattle to graze on.55 As with hundreds of other ranchers 
across the West, the profitability of their ranch depended on the 
grazing resources of those leases.56 But once public land grazing 
had become a target of several national environmental groups, 
these groups threatened the ranchers that their leases would not 
be renewed unless grazing could be done in an environmentally 
benign way.57 
Another way the Iversons kept their ranch solvent was by 
spending a fair amount of time in the local woods, supplying 
timber to local sawmills.58 Some of that timber came from private 
land, like their ranch, but some also came from Forest Service 
land.59 As with public land grazing, some national environmental 
groups sought to end all commercial harvesting of timber from 
public land.60 If successful, those efforts would have reduced 
the thin margin that supported the Iverson ranch and family. 
Ultimately, the family survived by collaborating with neighbors 
and local interests in the Blackfoot Challenge. Whether it was 
grazing or logging, the Iversons and their neighbors (including 
the neighboring sawmills) learned that they had to become 
conservationists to preserve their way of life. It is primarily the 
Blackfoot Challenge that enabled them to do that. Above all, i 
t has given them a new way of working with conservation 
organizations like the Nature Conservancy or Trout Unlimited, 
and with government agencies like the Forest Service. 
Both federal and state land management agencies are seated 
on the Board of Blackfoot Challenge, and Iverson spends a lot 
of time working with them.61 When asked whether his involve-
ment with this collaborative group has changed his view of 
government, Iverson responded, “It’s changed it in a big way. 
Before, I was just trying to scratch a living out of the ground. 
I was a pretty right-wing conservative, with very little use for 
government, especially the federal government.”62 Although he 
has not changed his core principles, he now recognizes that both 
he and the government agencies have changed since their initial 
consultations; Iverson considers himself to be more moderate 
than before, 63 and says that the agencies are “more efficient 
[and] more responsive.”64 Iverson attributes his involvement with 
the Blackfoot Challenge with enabling him to see the agency 
personnel as people who share similar community values.65 
According to Iverson, “When the meeting’s over, we’ll buy them 
a beer. In fact, we’d never have gotten to know each other so well 
if we hadn’t started going to Trixie’s Antler Saloon together.”66 
Iverson and the Blackfoot Challenge have show “how govern-
ment works—or maybe more important, how it can work.”67 
Here again, as with the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, 
a diverse group of citizens has taken the initiative to conserve a 
place that is near and dear to their hearts. As a result, the Black-
foot Challenge’s mission statement, “to coordinate efforts that 
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conserve and enhance the natural resources and rural way of life 
throughout the watershed,” has finally become a reality.68
The valles caldera TrusT
At present, one of the strongest tributes to the effective-
ness of collaboration in the public land and resource arena 
is the fact that the practice itself has become more often 
blessed, if not mandated, by both statutes and agency rules and 
procedures.69 One good statutory example is the Valles Caldera 
Trust.70 In 2000, Congress acquired the privately-owned Baca 
Ranch in northern New Mexico.71 Instead of giving one of the 
existing land management agencies responsibility for this newly 
acquired public land, Congress mandated that “an experimental 
management regime should be provided by the establishment of 
a trust capable of using new methods of public land manage-
ment that may prove cost-effective and environmentally sensi-
tive.”72 Specifically, Congress established a diverse, multiparty 
governing board for the land and its natural resources and, in 
effect, mandated that it be managed collaboratively.73 Given the 
initial success of the Valles Caldera Trust, Congress again called 
collaboration into play three years later in the Healthy For-
ests Restoration Act of 2003.74 This shows that Congress has 
confidence in the various stakeholders’ ability to “reduce wildfire 
risk to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk 
Federal land through a collaborative process of planning, priori-
tizing, and implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects.”75 
movIng ToWards governmenT-InITIaTed 
collaBoraTIve land and naTural  
resource managemenT
Following this trend toward governmental involvement, 
public land management agencies themselves now routinely 
invite or encourage collaboration among various stakeholders. 
To illustrate this type of collaboration, consider the ongoing 
process to develop a new planning rule for the Forest Service. 
The National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), which governs 
land and resource management in the national forests, requires 
the Agency to develop plans for all national forests and grass-
lands.76 The Forest Service adopted the first set of rules to guide 
the development of these plans in 1979.77 Although the planning 
rules were revised in 1982, all four subsequent attempts to revise 
the rules have each failed.78 
In 2009, at the direction of the Obama administration, 
the Forest Service launched yet another effort to revise and 
update the planning rules.79 Collaboration has emerged as a 
hallmark of this new process. According to the official Forest 
Service website, the agency “is committed to developing a new 
planning rule that endures over time. We believe a transparent 
and participatory method is the best way to accomplish this. 
We’ll be working hard to gather input collaboratively throughout 
the development of a new planning rule.”80 
This rulemaking approach is an example of how govern-
ment agencies now frequently use collaboration. In this case, 
it is being used to develop administrative rules, but agencies 
also increasingly use collaboration to develop policy proposals, 
management plans, and site-specific work plans.81 The govern-
ment’s use of collaboration is not limited to natural resources 
and environmental policy, and is increasingly invoked at every 
level—local, state, and federal—to formulate (via the legislative 
branch) and implement (via the executive branch) public policy.82 
However, the transition of place-specific collaborative 
results into legislation remains problematic. One observer has 
noted, for example, “if replicated more broadly, the place-based 
approach to forest management could further disaggregate the 
National Forest system.”83 This concern was also echoed by 
Undersecretary of Agriculture Harris Sherman when he testi-
fied on Senator Tester’s pending bill, noting that place-specific 
collaboration “establishes a potentially harmful precedent 
because it may lead to multiple site-specific legislative efforts 
transferring much needed resources from other units of the 
National Forest System where priority work must also be 
accomplished.”84 Here again, the difficulty may be viewed as 
a manifestation of the old problem of the few and the many. 
The perspective of a more broadly representative, but genuinely 
deliberative, public could be brought to bear on some of these 
conflicts, which could expand the range of public involve-
ment without necessarily losing the problem solving impetus 
that has led to the collaborative solution in the first place. 
Integration of the enactment into legislation of place-based col-
laborative management into legislation, then, is both promising 
and problematic. 
The one thing that contributes most significantly to the 
steady expansion of collaborative problem solving is the fact 
that, in so many circumstances, it works. And in fact, it works 
better than other available democratic mechanisms.85 In evo-
lutionary terms, this is a straightforward example of natural 
selection: what works well survives and thrives.86 Collaboration 
has gained a foothold in certain niches of our political ecology 
because it brings a kind of selective advantage to those settings. 
conclusIon
Although these government-sponsored efforts are a wel-
come addition to the ecology of democracy, they represent 
a qualitatively different kind of collaboration than the type of 
citizeninitiated collaboration illustrated by the Beaverhead– 
Deerlodge Partnership or the Blackfoot Challenge. Our experi-
ence has convinced us that, at least in the public lands arena, 
collaboration would never have been widely employed by agen-
cies, let alone mandated by legislative bodies, had it not initially 
emerged in a completely organic, indirect way, and if it had not 
proven its viability on the challenging political landscape that 
produced it. It is this organic, citizen-initiated form of collabora-
tion that we mean when we speak of “collaborative democracy.” 
Encouraging as the government adoption of collaborative 
methods may be, it also raises questions about how readily col-
laboration can be transposed into settings that vary substantially 
from those in which it emerged. To extend the ecological meta-
phor a step further, creating collaborative approaches to public 
land and resource issues by the use of legislation or administra-
tive practice can be viewed as the equivalent of domesticating 
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animals or plants that originally emerged and evolved in the 
wild. Useful and often lovable as these domesticated species 
may be, it nevertheless remains true that a dog is not a wolf, 
nor is a cat a tiger. Thus, while we promote and encourage 
collaboration in a number of constrained institutional settings, 
the need to preserve space and if possible, native habitat, means 
that collaborative democracy must continue to flourish and 
evolve in its own organic, undirected way.87
Recall, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge, the land-
owner-based group in Montana that helps to coordinate the 
management of the Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent 
public and private lands.88 The Challenge was organized locally, 
but known nationally as a model for preserving the rural character, 
ecological health, and natural beauty of its watershed.89 It sup-
ports environmentally responsible resource stewardship through 
cooperation of private and public interests.90 These interested par-
ties all share a common vision of how the Challenge operates in 
the Blackfoot watershed, and all believe that success is most likely 
to result from building trust by working together. 
The Blackfoot Challenge, however, is merely part of a 
grander scheme. It is a good example of how place-based collab-
orative efforts often “nest” within one another as the watershed 
lies within the much larger Crown of the Continent.91 During the 
past eight years, a number of independent and complementary 
initiatives (including the Blackfoot Challenge) have emerged to 
promote conservation and community stewardship in this remark-
able landscape.92 These initiatives present the prospect of grander 
collaboration between individual collaborative coalitions. 
The enticing possibility is that this nesting of networked, 
collaborative initiatives will evolve into new forms of gover-
nance. This is best described by Meg Wheatley and Deborah 
Frieze in “Using Emergence to Take Social Innovations to 
Scale,” as a common phase in the process of emergence char-
acterized by “the sudden appearance of a system that has real 
power and influence.”93 Further, Wheatley and Frieze explain 
how “[p]ioneering efforts that hovered at the periphery suddenly 
become the norm.”94 
This emerging system has profound implications for 
regional entrepreneurs. By better understanding the emergent 
properties of nested, place-based collaborative efforts in a locale 
like the Crown of the Continent, individuals and organizations 
will be better poised to mobilize political power and facilitate 
lasting change. Coincidentally, they can also develop and test 
new forms of governance, thinking regionally and acting at 
whatever spatial scale makes sense. 
These, then, are some of the governance implications that 
seem to be manifesting in conjunction with the ongoing emer-
gence of collaboration (especially place-based collaboration) as 
a democratic form. While it may be impossible to predict with 
any precision what exact forms of democratic governance might 
actually emerge, it seems clear that the better we understand 
the dynamics driving these exciting and promising develop-
ments, the better positioned we will be to encourage those most 
likely to advance both the cause of democracy and protection of 
America’s natural resources. 
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